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since it ultimately becomes a question for national debate and solu-
tion by representative bodies. Why not leave unspecified constitu-
tional rights with the legislatures in the first place? 
It is unlikely that a national consensus will ever be reached on 
a fixed set of rules for the exercise of judicial review so long as right 
and wrong remain relative terms determined by counting votes. 
Only if we return to the founders' public philosophy can we retain 
the spirit of constitutional government. Otherwise, constitutional 
choices are made on the basis of personal preference. We cannot 
expect the Constitution and a stable American system to survive the 
onslaught of the Jacobin ideology which permits personal desires to 
determine public policy. Such an attitude will not preserve history's 
most successful constitutional order nor that noble document "in-
tended to endure for ages to come" upon which it is based. 
CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION. 
Edited by Terence Balli and J.G.A. Pocock.2 Lawrence, Kan-
sas: University of Kansas Press. 1988. Pp. x, 218. $25.00. 
Stephen A. Conrad 3 
Most of the essays in this volume originated as papers for pres-
entation at an April1987 conference at the Folger Institute for Ren-
aissance and Eighteenth-Century Studies, where Professor Pocock 
has for some time now been a leading presence in collective reflec-
tion on how best to approach the history of political thought. It's 
no surprise, then, that the book offers methodological self-con-
sciousness aplenty. But if anything, Professor Ball's distinctive 
methodological commitments are even more apparent here than are 
Pocock's. Indeed, some of Ball's fellow contributors to this volume 
have taken a stand squarely with him in these commitments, which 
look to the current Begriffsgeschichte ("conceptual history") move-
ment in Germany as a guide for improving the study of the history 
of Anglo-American political theory. To be sure, several of the es-
says collected here don't show any special affinity with this new 
school of conceptual history; but what's most noteworthy about the 
volume overall is how so many of them do. 
I. Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota. 
2. Harry C. Black Professor of History, The Johns Hopkins University. 
3. Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington. 
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I 
James Farr's essay is the first and maybe the best example. It's 
also the broadest in its implications; in fact, it even includes some 
remarks addressing the Critical Legal Studies movement wholesale, 
and Duncan Kennedy's penchant for structuralism in particular. In 
the setting of this volume, however, the most important purpose 
served by Farr's essay is to begin to address what is meant by "con-
ceptual change" as a term of art derived from contemporary Euro-
pean methods of conceptual history and adopted by Ball and 
Pocock as the titular focus of the book they have assembled.4 To-
gether with Ball and Russell Hanson, who also contributes an essay 
here, Farris one of the editors of a recent collection of essays from 
Cambridge University Press entitled Political Innovation and Con-
ceptual Change. And the crux of the instant essay by Farr is the 
relationship he posits between "constitutional innovation" (which 
he takes to be a species of political innovation) and conceptual 
change as a "constitutive" agent of such innovation. 
The constitutive function in question is, of course, that per-
formed by language itself-a topic rendered almost trite nowadays 
in the simplest treatments of it. But Pocock, for one, almost never 
lapses into simplicity. Nor does Farr in this essay. He does, how-
ever, achieve a welcome clarity, paradoxically by renouncing 
pretensions to universalistic, predictive "general theory" in his 
"sketch" of a nonetheless broadly applicable account of how the 
conceptual language of politics changes over time, and how such 
conceptual change is related to changes beyond language. 
Invoking Karl Popper, Farr argues that "contradiction" and 
"criticism" are the "triggers" par excellence of the "mechanisms" 
of conceptual change, quite often in political life, and in the found-
ing of American constitutionalism as a case in point. Moreover his 
idea of "contradiction" is as closely identified with politics (or, 
more precisely, ideological politics) as it is scrupulously restricted 
to the particular meanings to be found in specific historical 
contexts.s 
This approach leads to a more appreciative view of the capabil-
ity of "contradiction" than what Farr sees in that paradigm of CLS 
exegesis by Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Com-
mentaries.6 In contrast to Kennedy, Farr theorizes that 
4. See Farr's bibliographic footnote, at 29, esp. his citations to review articles by Mel-
vin Richter. Cf Richter's more recent remarks in 17 PoL. THEORY 296 (1989). 
5. Cf Farr, Understanding Conceptual Change Politically, in POLITICAL INNOVATION 
AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGE 24-49 (T. Ballet a/. eds. 1989) 24-49. 
6. 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 28 (1979). 
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contradictions exist largely between beliefs ... ; and structures (like "practices," a 
term I prefer) may be said to be contradictory only to the extent that the beliefs that 
constitute them are contradictory. Moreover, contradictions between beliefs beget 
"motion," if you like, but it is a motion of reflection and discourse that tries and 
often succeeds in propelling us beyond the particular contradiction of its motiva-
tion. This suggests--contrary to the claims of Critical Legal Studies-that contra-
dictions are historically contingent and may be resolved. And in resolving them, 
doubtless others will occur, even in a world of modest change, much less in a world 
of conceptual and practical turbulence of the sort that 1787 symbolizes. 
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Parr is thus not only more strictly historicist and contextualist 
than Kennedy in his approach to the analysis of contradictions, 
Parr is also, by virtue of the premium he places on historical con-
text, a good deal more "liberal" and "whiggish"-adjectives that 
Pocock himself has suggested are all but inevitably applicable to the 
proper study of the history of Anglophone political thought. 1 
In contemplating the "successful," "innovative" resolution of 
historically contingent contradictions in early American constitu-
tional thought, Parr aligns himself with the still-prevailing "ideo-
logical turn" in the historiography of the Founding, in the work of 
Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood, Pocock, and so many others who 
either agree with them or follow their lead if only by rebutting them 
in the very terms they have set. This is most obviously what 
Begri.ffsgeschichte shares with the ideological school of early Ameri-
can historiography: analysis organized around a canon of political 
keywords located in their immediate discursive contexts. Parr 
could not be on firmer ground when he points this out and quotes 
Bailyn, Wood, and Pocock in support of his own call for a more 
concentrated focus on "contradictions" (and "ambiguities") as the 
essence of both the Americans' "Revolutionary frame of mind" and 
their chief accomplishments as innovative constitutionalists after 
1776. 
The second essay in this volume, by Gerald Stourzh, is em-
blematic of the collection in the way it harnesses the lexicographical 
format of the Begri.ffsgeschichte method to engaged but disciplined 
political science like that of Ball, Parr, and Hanson. Stourzh traces 
the "changing meanings" of the term "constitution" in 17th- and 
18th-century England and America, with a view to isolating the 
"greatest innovations" of the founders in a reconceptualization of 
"constitutionalism" so epic that this partly medieval, partly early-
modern concept could become the best promise for securing 
"human rights" in the twentieth century. 
Yet Stourzh's attention throughout most of his essay is devoted 
7. See, e.g., POCOCK, VIRTUE, AND COMMERCE, AND HISTORY 1-34, esp. 32-34 
(I 985). 
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less to the climactic conceptual innovations of the founders than to 
the "roots" of constitutionalism with which he contrasts those inno-
vations. His own summary of his thesis may therefore recall the 
variable whiggishness of several generations of Mcllwainians and 
neo-Mcllwainians:s 
There are [he submits] two quite distinct roots of applying the word "constitution" 
to the sphere of government (in the largest sense). The first, and by far the most 
important one, is to be found in the application of analogies from nature to politics, 
or, to be more precise, in the transfer to bodies corporate or political of a term that 
is usually applied to the physical body. The second root is to be found in the rise in 
importance, around the middle of the seventeenth century, of the legal term "consti-
tutions" (always used in the plural form), which ultimately can be traced to the 
constitutiones of Roman and canon law. 
Even for readers to whom this argument sounds familiar there may 
be surprises in this essay: characteristically, Stourzh has fresh evi-
dence of formulaic orthodoxies; and as often as not it calls for refin-
ing or reconsidering them. 
If it's fair to say that the greatest interest of Stourzh's essay lies 
in new evidence rather than novel argument, then it's apt to remark 
of the subsequent essay, by Pocock, that many of his incidental 
points and asides may prove more interesting than his overarching 
thesis. That thesis is announced in the title, States, Republics, and 
Empires: The American Founding in Early Modern Perspective; 
which is to say that Pocock marshalls observations about the foun-
ders' reconceptions of the terms "state" and "republic," and their 
assimilation of the term "empire," in order to fortify what has be-
come one of his signature propositions: "The Constitution of the 
United States was a great achievement of early-modem [that is, not 
modem] politics, and a great deal may be learned by viewing it in 
early-modem terms." 
Still, Pocock hardly denies that the founders were innovators: 
Not only did Madison and many of his Federalist allies reduce the 
heady richness of early modem "republican" theory, by converting 
"the word 'republic' to mean 'government through representa-
tives'"; they no less profoundly transformed the meaning of the 
term "federal," divorcing it from its sense of the "federative" power 
that in early-modem theory was attributed exclusively to sovereign 
states. Henceforth "federal" would conventionally denote, in 
America and beyond, "a government elected by the people ... [and] 
8. See Katz, The Problem of Colonial Legal History, in COLONIAL BRITISH AMERICA: 
EsSAYS IN THE NEW HISTORY OF THE EARLY MODERN ERA 457·89, esp. 476 and 458 
(Greene & Pole eds. 1984); cf generally Katz, The American Constitution: A Revolutionary 
Interpretation, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERI-
CAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 23-37 (Beeman eta/. eds. 1987). 
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exercising sovereignty [directly] over the individuals composing a 
civil society" unto itself. Despite the classic work on this very 
theme by Martin Diamond, Samuel Beer, Gordon Wood, and a few 
others, Pocock is right, I believe, to urge the importance of pursuing 
the study of this transformation of the word "federal," because the 
topic does indeed seem to have been "little studied in recent years. "9 
Nevertheless, Pocock's ruminations here on methodology are 
likely to be of much wider interest than any proposal for historians 
to reorder their substantive research agendas. Not that Pocock lays 
out specific prescriptions of method. But some of his obiter dicta 
seem to indicate a departure from the almost boundless pluralism 
and relativism that have generally marked his oeuvre. To take one 
example, he writes as follows, in contemplation of "rules" (no less!) 
for historical contextualization and interpretation: 
[T]he historian, and in particular the historian of discourse, is committed by his 
vocation to operating in an open context; it is, in other words, hard to find any 
theoretical limit to the number and variety of contexts in which past historical ac-
tion may be situated for purposes of interpretation. There must, for this reason, be 
rules and disciplinary procedures for admitting new contexts of interpretation and 
for demonstrating their relevance and validity; but these rules must themselves be 
constantly open to discussion. 
Such concern for authority notwithstanding, Pocock is hardly in-
clined to take up the methods of the jurisprudence of "original in-
tent." Indeed, he and Ball evidently agree on the matter: the 
Introduction to the volume, which appears under both their names, 
concludes with a memorably elegant argument that historians who 
search for "original intent" are deluding themselves as much about 
what they are doing as what they are seeking. 
II 
Although not yet as well known to legal scholars as the estab-
lished luminaries of the ideological school, the younger historian 
Peter Onuf has already made an indispensable place for himself in 
partial association with it. His research tends to build upon and 
complement it; but he never fails to uncover and synthesize evi-
dence in his own way. His is the fourth essay in the collection. 
And although he has entitled it State Sovereignty and the Making of 
the Constitution, and aims throughout to explore the meanings of 
"state sovereignty" as a discursive concept at the Founding, he 
m?re than any of the other conceptual historians contributing to 
thts volume takes note of the "pragmatism" of the founders as a 
9. My own attempt to pursue the matter is Metaphor and Imagination in James Wil-
son's Theory of Federal Union, 13 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY I (1988). 
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dimension of their "rhetoric." This orientation serves him very well 
in restoring to its authentic salience the practical point that at the 
Founding, in order to disarm the localism of the Antifederalists-
eminently reasonable as it must have then seemed-the Federalists 
had to make and win an argument "that their goal was to preserve 
and strengthen the states, not to destroy them." This is a point that 
may just have been decisive in the Ratification debates; and it has 
remained continually important throughout the two ensuing centu-
ries of the rhetoric of federalism in America. 
Beyond this main point of Onuf's, however, his essay is to my 
knowledge unrivalled as a brief exposition of the aspirational char-
acter of the Antifederalists' republican theory at its most compel-
ling-to many of their contemporaries if not to many of us today. 
Next comes a piece by Garry Wills-short, but with preten-
sions to an arresting revisionism that goes beyond anything at-
tempted by any of the other contributors. The title is James 
Wilson's New Meaning for Sovereignty; and as in the work of virtu-
ally every major twentieth-century commentator on Wilson's con-
stitutional theory, the new meaning credited to Wilson is that of 
"popular sovereignty" as an operative concept. But Wills departs 
radically from earlier commentators in tracing Wilson's conception 
of popular sovereignty to none other than Rousseau. According to 
Wills, Rousseau was Wilson's "mentor." Wilson's "profound un-
derstanding and use" of Rousseau was absolutely "central" -albeit 
virtually unacknowledged by Wilson himself and quite "unrecog-
nized" by Wilson's best students to date-in the Lectures on Law, 
Wilson's summa on American constitutionalism. 
As evidence for such claims, Wills relies on what he takes to be 
textual parallels between the Lectures and the Social Contract. Wil-
son had a "version" of "the general will," and it was Rousseau's. 
"For Wilson, no less than for Rousseau, the only legitimate govern-
ment was a continuing revolution." 
There is undoubtedly something to this perspective on Wilson. 
But it is difficult at best to assess how much, at least on the basis of 
Wills's slim evidence and apodictic approach. Since Wills is said to 
be at work on a book about Wilson, I'm resolved to withhold judg-
ment for now, despite my own recent inclination to accord far less 
"central" a place than does Wills to voluntarism (not to mention 
Rousseau's "general will") in Wilson's constitutional theory .w 
10. See Conrad, Polite Foundation: Citizenship and Common Sense in James Wilson's 
Republican Theory, 1984 SuP. Cr. REv. 359, esp. 38lff (1985); Conrad, James Wilson's "As-
similation of the Common-law Mind," 84 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming). But the best cor-
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III 
The sixth essay is a revised version of a prize-winning article 
recently published by Daniel Walker Howe in the preeminent jour-
nal of early American history, the William and Mary Quarterly. 
For this collection Howe has slightly modified the title and the em-
phasis of that article to bring his work more in line with the "lin-
guistic turn." The title here is The Language of Faculty Psychology 
in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS; and his thesis, as he restates it at 
the outset, is that: 
The conventional paradigm that did most to shape the argument of The Federalist 
was eighteenth-century faculty psychology. By examining the authors' use of the 
language of faculty psychology we can discover what they meant by such crucial 
terms as "interest," "balance," "reason," "passion," and "virtue" in The Federalist. 
Only then can we appreciate how they were adapting conventional conceptions to 
the needs of a new nation and a new political order. 
Nevertheless, this formulation of the thesis doesn't fully con-
vey the force of Howe's novel analysis. Although he scrupulously 
avoids what he himself calls the "mistake" of trying "to extract 
from [The Federalist] a complete political theory or a comprehen-
sive statement of the relation between government and virtue, such 
as one finds in Aristotle," Howe does venture a reinterpretation that 
would seem to ground the entire argument of The Federalist on one 
"coherent model" of "human nature." This is a reductive exercise 
that resembles many another efforts to find, as Howe intimates he 
has found, the "key" to both "the rhetoric" and "the argument" of 
Publius. 
But even if Howe goes too far in claiming to have shown con-
clusively that "Publius constructed his political science on the 
model of faculty psychology," Howe's is a welcome corrective to 
tidy ahistorical interpretations of The Federalist. For example, 
Howe lays special emphasis on the importance of reading the psy-
chological terminology of Publius in light of the teachings of 
Thomas Reid's eighteenth-century Scottish school of moral philoso-
phy, which by the 1780s was already in its early heydey in America. 
And in this light Howe finds that, "what looks to twentieth-century 
eyes like broker-state pluralism [in The Federalist] was, to Publius's 
contemporaries, subsumed within a familiar scheme of eighteenth-
century moral philosophy-namely, the principle of countervailing 
passions." 
Occasionally I am given pause by the thoroughgoing symmetry 
of Howe's interpretation, as when Howe so thoroughly "identifies" 
rective to Wills on Wilson remains George M. Dennison, The "Revolution Principle": 
Ideology and Constitutionalism in the Thought of James Wilson, 39 REV. PoL. 157 (1977). 
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Publius's conception of the executive branch of government with 
the "will" as a faculty of the mind that Howe surmises, by analogy: 
As the will ought to implement fixed principles and conclusions of the understand-
ing, according to Reid's psychology, so the executive [according to Publius] ought 
to enforce only laws enacted by the legislature [the branch of government Howe 
says Publius identified with "the understanding"). In identifying the executive with 
the will, Publius was not making the presidency supreme but was emphasizing its 
rationality and subordination to the law. 
This sort of categorical resolution of the celebrated ambiguities of 
The Federalist gives little hint of the idea of the energetic and in-
dependent, not merely implementing, presidency that Madison 
came to propound at the 1787 Federal Convention. Granted, 
Howe's essay focuses on the text of The Federalist, deliberately ex-
cluding almost all context other than the source literature of eight-
eenth-century faculty psychology. Therefore nothing Madison, or 
Hamilton, or Jay said or wrote outside The Federalist is to Howe's 
point; nor is anything written by any of their Federalist allies or 
Antifederalist opponents. These, to my mind, unquestionably sig-
nificant elements of context are excluded from consideration by 
Howe so that he can more fully highlight an element of context 
usually overlooked. Ultimately he is very persuasive that his dis-
tinctive project is worth the candle, however many qualms one 
might have about some of the conclusions he reaches along the 
way-such as my concern that Howe repeatedly overestimates the 
rationalism of Publius (and of Thomas Reid, for that matter). 
IV 
As I see it, the sixth and seventh essays in the volume, Ball's 
and Hanson's, are the center of gravity ofthe entire collection. Like 
Farr's, their methods as conceptual historians require them to take 
historical contingency seriously; yet they are implicitly as engaged 
with our political controversies as with those of the founders. At 
the very least, Ball and Hanson evince an attachment to the idea of 
political "principles" the value of which ultimately depend little if 
at all on historical context. More than that, both Ball and Hanson 
privilege one principle-"democracy"-as a virtually suprahistori-
cal, foundational value. 
Whatever its merits, such a pairing as that I perceive between 
concern for historical/acts and concern with enduring political val-
ues is bound to make for a complex point of view. I infer that a self-
consciousness about this complexity is at the heart of the method-
ological commitments of Ball and company as "conceptual 
historians." 
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In Ball's essay here (a shortened version of an essay that ap-
pears in a more obviously engaged book), 1 1 Ball says he aims to 
reexamine the debate between the Federalists and Antifederalists as 
a "conceptual-cum-political controversy with an eye to discerning 
the argumentative and rhetorical resources used by both sides to 
preserve old meanings or, alternatively, to create new ones." Al-
most as if to emphasize methodology over substance, Ball chooses 
as his particular topic the contested meanings at the Founding of 
that now so widely mooted term/concept "republicanism." "My 
reason," says Ball, "for retreading this oft-trod ground is to bring 
into bold relief the conceptual dimensions of the controversy over 
ratification." This leads Ball to what is to me his most important 
contention: in reviewing some of the aspects of the disputed mean-
ing of "republicanism" in the 1780s, he claims to show "how the 
ratification debate took a 'linguistic tum' as the protagonists be-
came increasingly aware of the conceptually constituted character 
of their respective views of politics and citizenship." 
There is an undisguised critical edge to such a contention. In 
characterizing late eighteenth-century "conceptual changes" in the 
meaning of republicanism as "rational strategies in a hard-fought 
conceptual-cum-political struggle," Ball does not pretend to remain 
perfectly neutral as between the two sides in the struggle. He avers 
that: 
Although both groups [Antifederalist and Federalist] may be said to have inhabited 
essentially the same "universe of republican discourse," it is worth noting that while 
one wished to maintain the boundaries of that universe, the other wished to redraw 
them. 
And it is worth noticing that as authority for this view Ball cites 
important books by the authors of the two final essays in this collec-
tion, The Democratic Imagination in America (1985) by Russell 
Hanson, and The Jeffersonian Persuasion (1978) by Lance Banning. 
It is the perspective Ball largely shares with Hanson and Banning 
that heightens the core "irony" (to use Ball's term) of Madisonian 
republicanism: "Even though the meaning of the word 'republic' 
may be mutable, Madison contends, the principles of republicanism 
are timeless and above the partisan fray." And Ball concludes his 
own essay on a note of bracing ambiguity as to the problem of 
reaching a historically informed estimation of Federalism qua 
republicanism: 
In revising the meaning of "republic." Publius had not merely changed the meaning 
of a word. He had constituted a world. Whether or in what sense that world was 
II. T. BALL, TRANSFORMING POLITICAL DISCOURSE: PoLITICAL THEORY A:"D CRIT-
ICAL CONCEPTUAL HISTORY (1988), chap. 3: Reconstituting Republican Discourse. 
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any longer recognizably "republican" continues to be a matter of dispute. (emphasis 
added) 
Ball's pregnant use of the word "recognizably" is a nice transi-
tion to the subsequent essay by Hanson, entitled "Commons" and 
"Commonwealth" at the American Founding: Democratic Republi-
canism as the New American Hybrid. Ball is posing the difficult 
question Hanson squarely addresses, the question of the historically 
unstable but principled distinction and interrelation between "de-
mocracy" and "republicanism" that Madison and his allies re-
worked in order to achieve a Founding widely revered by strong 
and weak democrats alike for over two centuries. Moreover, Han-
son could not be plainer that the Federalists' "success," such as it 
was in their own day and thereafter, was not the function of a pre-
vailing "consensus" on fundamental political values. 
As Hanson says, by 1787, "[f]or the Antifederalists ... the 
Revolution was over." Not so for their innovative opponents: "If 
the Antifederalists desired a popularly limited government, the Fed-
eralists advanced the idea of a limited popular government ... [and 
to be] less popular in orientation [was to be] not so obviously repub-
lican in character." (emphasis added). 
The import of Hanson's adverb "obviously" is the same as that 
of Ball's "recognizably": historical contingency notwithstanding, 
all is not flux; there is a shape to some processes and events that 
yields a fixed point of reference. How else are we to read Hanson's 
cadence: "[By the age of Andrew Jackson, d]emocracy had proved 
irresistible. Madison's carefully wrought distinction between demo-
cratic and republican forms of government had broken down, and 
the work of the Revolution had truly been completed"? 
Hanson's is, however, something of a "false" cadence, espe-
cially in relation to Lance Banning's essay, which completes this 
collection. Because Banning has been such a prominent and 
thoughtful spokesman on behalf of the importance of republicanism 
in early American history, 12 the title alone of his essay is especially 
significant: Some Second Thoughts on Virtue and the Course of Rev-
olutionary Thinking. For many republican theorists of the eight-
eenth century and neo-republicans of the twentieth, "virtue" is a 
conceptual keyword of almost talismanic overtones. And often its 
charm lies in its legitimation of a civic culture that emphasizes the 
sacrifice of self-interest to the public interest. 
Whatever the meaning of a politics of virtue could or should be 
today, Banning wants to remove this notion of sacrifice from the 
12. Cf Banning, Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas in the New 
American Republic, 63 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1986). 
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central place some historians have accorded It m reconstructing 
Madisonian republicanism. Instead, Banning finds the "most essen-
tial meaning" of "virtue" -to Madison and to most Americans 
throughout the eighteenth century-in the ethos of eighteenth-cen-
tury British opposition politics: "a jealous, vigilant commitment to 
the public life: continuing participation in a politics that trusted 
only limited responsibilities to national officials and demanded, even 
so, that these officials be continuously watched for any signs of an 
appearance of a separate set of interests." 
Some might say that this conception of Madisonian republican-
ism collapses republicanism into liberalism altogether. On its face 
Banning's point as quoted here might be interpreted to say as much. 
But attentive regard to exactly how he reaches his point doesn't ad-
mit of so facile a synthesis-or, indeed, of definitive synthesis at all. 
Yet paradoxically, by refusing to isolate the thought of a theorist 
like Madison from its immediate contexts, Banning illustrates the 
coherence of an-not the-eighteenth-century republican tradition 
identifiable by its essence, despite the impossibility of giving a com-
prehensive account of that tradition. 
Banning thus reminds us that it is this essentialism-and a 
faith in the meaningfulness of essences inhering in political concepts 
and their keywords-that gives a unity (although not a unanimity) 
to this collection of essays. It is not the essentialism of Aristotle, or 
of Montesquieu, but of a group proceeding under the banner of 
"conceptual history." And as much as most of them owe to Aris-
totle or Montesquieu or both, they take pains to derive their essen-
tialism from historical data unimagined by either. 
